Ukraine has introduced an interesting and unique e-procurement system with an extensive public monitoring platform. This platform appears to boost society’s efforts to tackle corruption and collusion in public procurement. In the project with Bruno Baranek and Leon Musolff (both Princeton University), we develop a new collusion detection algorithm and document the effects of the […]
On the Cost of Favoritism in Public Procurement
A new working paper (with Bruno Baranek) on the role of personal political connections in public procurement is now available as Discussion Paper of the Department of Economics at KU Leuven. Our findings, on detailed data on firm representatives’ political affiliations in the Czech Republic, show that favoritism to politically connected firms increases the price […]
Policy study on political campaign donations and public procurement in Czechia
A think-tank IDEA of the CERGE-EI (a joint research center of the Charles University and the Czech Academy of Sciences) published our summary on the effects of political donations on the public procurement market in the Czech regions. Our results show that an additional donation of 1 EUR is linked to additional procurement contracts in […]
A new working paper on “Political donations, public procurement and government efficiency”
The first version of the second chapter of my PhD thesis on “Political donations, public procurement and government efficiency” (with Kristof De Witte and Benny Geys) is out as CESifo WP nr. 7591.
The article on political donations and the allocations of public procurement contracts published in EER.
My first academic article (together with Benny Geys) has been published at European Economic Review (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.11.004). A short less technical summary can be found on VoxEU (in English) and Roklen24 (in Czech). In this article, we study whether and when donating to a political party induces favouritism in the allocation of procurement contracts. We find […]